This article suggests that a critical approach as the CLS could have deeper and stronger impact on the transformation of reality if it embraced a concept of linguistic coherence on a basic level. It presents a general critique of Brazilian Courts decision-making process and a claim that in cases in which evaluative words and expressions are at stake, there is an implicit duty of using an extra step on the reasoning in order to translate those words and expressions into descriptive ones. That practice permits accountability and transparency of the use of power by judges and decision-makers in general.
Introduction
Th is article will explore the self-declared limits of 3 Th e theory intends to reveal and ultimately denounce the underlying power relations in decisions, denying any possibility of examining decision correctness. I think it is possible, however, to go beyond this point through an analytical, theoretical instrument; I would suggest the possibility of decisions analysis using the concept of coherence, as used in the prescriptive language theory. Despite its theoretical specifi city, the argument fi ts into a broader spectrum of ideas, leading toward social status quo transformation. Th is explains the interest in the CLS.
Is it possible to reveal and denounce power relations present in the judiciary deciding practices using an analytical instrument of formal logic? Th is question delineates the paper's scope.
Th e idea is to advance a participative democratic idea, enhancing accountability in the judiciary and revealing inconsistencies in the decision-making process that weaken its transparency, and therefore impeding criticism.
I assume that there is, in Brazil's case, a defi cit of democratic participation in public institutions, and specifi cally that such a defi cit occurs in relation to the performance of the judiciary. Th us, the main point of interest here is the work of judges from a critical perspective.
Th e political inspiration for the argument is the idea that transformation implies individual consciousness 4 ; this requires access to information and demystification of rhetorical discourses. Th e present undertaking 2 GORDON, Robert W. Unfreezing legal reality: critical approaches to law. Florida State University Law Review, Tallahassee, v. 15, n. 2, p. 195-220, Summer, 1987. p. 196. 3 UNGER, Roberto Mangabeira: Th e critical legal studies movement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. 1. 4 TRUBEK, David M. Where the action is: critical legal studies and empiricism. Stanford Law Review, Stanford, v. 36, n. 1/2, p. 575-622, Jan. 1984. p. 608.
is, thus, the attempt to demonstrate that decisions could be more transparent, something that would facilitate discussion about their political nature.
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A word on the concept of accountability
Th e importance of applying the concept of coherence to judicial decisions refers to the possibility of their critical analysis. Public examination of decision rationales is one of the most eff ective ways to permit interaction between judges and society. Publicity of all decisions allows social control of the decision-making power. Th e idea that decision makers have to follow the principle of coherence is also tightly bound to transparency and accountability 6 of the actions of those who retain power by delegation. What judges and politicians do has be susceptible to collective knowledge and, therefore, to criticism, for the sake of public accountability.
Although the concept of accountability is mostly applied to the executive and the legislative powers, its applicability to the judiciary power is well recognized. Accountability is an important and essential requisite of the Rule of Law, which holds that those who occupy offi ces must account for their actions through pre-established juridical rules and legal provisions that determine the State organs' limits of the exercise of power.
7 Th e judiciary is, therefore, a central institution regarding the concept of accountability, since it is responsible for controlling the legality of other branches of State power. Th e judiciary itself, though, must also account for its decisions in a public manner, since it exercises power in the name of 5 Law application implies choices that have signifi cant impact in social allocation of material, political cultural and symbolic resources. SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa; RO-DRIGUES-GARAVITO, Cezar A. Law and globalization from below: towards a cosmopolitan legality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 29. 6 "Th e requirement for representatives to answer to the represented on the disposal of their powers and duties, act upon criticisms or requirements made of them, and accept (some) responsibility for failure, incompetence, or deceit. " MCLEAN, Ian; MCMILLAN, Alistair. Th e concise oxford dictionary of politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 7 "Judicial Independence and Judicial Reform in Latin America". DOMINGO, Pilar. Judicial independence and judicial reform in Latin America. In: SCHEDLER, Andreas; DIAMOND, Larry; PLATTNER, Mark F. (Ed) . Th e self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999. p. 151-175. Universitas JUS, v. 26, n. 1, p. 29-44, 2015 Critical legal studies and coherence in the decision-making process: the Brazilian case the whole society. It has the duty to act with transparency and responsibility.
It is also socially expected that a democratic and independent judiciary system be impartial and that the decisions observe a minimum standard of rationality.
Th us, ideally, a decider should not pass dubious or senseless judgments 8 and should consider the basic principles of logic and relevant facts.
Accountability is, therefore, an antidote against judicial arbitrariness, given that the judiciary holds enormous power and must respond 9 for how this power is used. 10 Although there are many ways to hold the judiciary accountable, such as inspection by higher courts in the hierarchy, my particular interest in this paper is the possibility of unveiling the rationales behind decisions and the consequent possibility of criticizing them.
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Critical Legal Studies
Judicial decisions criticism is only fully possible if the decisions are suffi ciently clear and criticizing a political aspect embedded in a judgment presupposes its adequate and public justifi cation. My argument in this article is that CLS' criticism of judicial verdicts can be strengthened by assuming a critical concept of coherence, since the informative use of language 12 entails a minimum of rationality. Coherence, thus, serves as a criterion for the appreciation of rationality in argumentation. I fi nd it possible, in this sense, to utilize a theoretical-analytical tool along with Critical Legal Studies. "we are united in that we would like our work, in so far as it is possible, to help in modest ways to realize the potential we believe exists to transform the practices of the legal system to help make this a more decent, equal, solidary society -less intensively ordered by hierarchies of class, status, 'merit' , race, and gender -more decentralized, democratic, and participatory both in its own forms of social life and in the forms it promotes in other countries. " GORDON, Robert W. Unfreezing legal reality: critical approaches to law. Florida State University Law Review, Tallahassee, v. 15, n. 2, p. 195-220, Summer, 1987. p. 197. institutional dimensions, another analytical dimension of an instrumental nature may be added: a propositional objective. 18 Hence the idea that the theory of language and formal logical principles may be useful instruments to show the argumentative inconsistencies in judicial decisions, which would further judicial accountability.
CLS and coherence: external perspective
Th ere are two possible ways to analyze a certain ruling: substantive and formal. Th e substantive evaluation of the "correctness" of any given opinion is very problematic, because we would have to admit some moral universal principles. A formal analysis, however, requires the use of logical principles applicable to language in general, as a precondition to communication intelligibility.
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Two principles that give consistency to communication among subjects, and which are "constituent" of language, are the principles of non-contradiction and of identity.
20 Th e principle of non-contradiction determines that the same individual cannot say distinct and confl icting things about the same object, risking the compromise of coherence of language. Th e principle of identity relates to the fact that an object can only be itself and nothing diff erent from itself. Th is way, coherence is a principle of prescriptive language. Perhaps the reason for which the CLS have not had the repercussion that its representatives hoped for may be the lack of a theoretic instrumental apparatus to cope with the concrete dimension of the judicial decision. "CLS no ha eleborado un nuevo programa politico y no ha infl uido ni en la vida politica americana ni en la vida interna de la profesion juridica. " KENNEDY, Duncan. Notas sobre la historia de CLS en los Estados Unidos. Revista Doxa, São Paulo, n. 11, p. 283-293, 1992 . p. 287 (CLS has not elaborated a new political program and has not infl uenced either American political life or the internal life of the juridical profession.)" Another explanation may simply be that, within the ideological dispute, the CLS representatives were won over. "Born of the social movements of the 1960's, Critical Legal Studies launched a powerful critique of law and legal education as institutions that actually legitimized the injustices of American society. However, like so many of the radical attempts of that time, it was largely defeated by the conservative forces whose ideas dominate law and society as a whole today. " GABEL, Peter. Law and hierarchy. Tikkun, Berkeley, v. 19, n. 2, p. 44, Mar./Apr. 2004 An important point is the impossibility that any method of Transparency of judicial decisions implies the public elaboration of the reasons that led the judge to decide in a determined way, allowing verifi cation of the rationality of the decisions. Such rationality relates to the plausibility of the argument through the use of an intelligible and adequate form, as well as of reasons considered adequate to justify a certain decision. It is the idea of coherence that allows us to determine the logical plausibility of a given speech. "Coherence, " though, can be applied in more than one sense, so it is necessary to defi ne it here in the sense I intend it.
Th e concept of coherence has two diff erent dimensions: internal and external.
22 From the internal perspective, which is therefore prescriptive in accordance with the interpretive tradition of authors like Robert Alexy, Ronald Dworking and Neil MacCormick, coherence plays a central role. In contrast, under a critical perspective, the idea of coherence is a myth, and the concept is considered a rhetorical device for decision legitimacy.
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I do not use the concept of coherence in the same way those authors do, as they propose a certain methodology for the production of decisions that imply some degree of normative objectivity. Alexy 24 works with a set of methodological control norms for the decision making process that, although formal, involve an ethical compromise of the decider with a universal minimum such as, for example, the supposition of good faith while judging.
Th is is incompatible with the critical propositions of CLS.
Dworkin
25 envisions an axiological minimum, expressed within the compromise of integrity, which decision appreciation, in which universal principles are adopted, may be used in combination with a critical perspective, because the latter denies any possibility of universal values. 22 Hart proposes that the law possesses an internal dimension, according to which the individual has a perception of duty in relation to the existence of a normative juridical order. Th is internal perspective is, according to the author, constitutive of the law and distinctive in relation to other normative orders. Th e use of the concept of "internal coherence" does not refer here to Hart's concept, but to a logical-linguistic one. HART, Herbert. O conceito de direito. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996. 23 CLS can be qualifi ed as a skeptical theory, as its theoretical proposition is deconstructive and denunciatory of a state of things, even though it does not propose a form of optimization of norm application. In this sense, in some way, CLS stands in oppositions to the traditional and analytical hermeutics. must be accepted as a precedent condition to come to a "correct" decision. Finally, MacCormick 26 works with a descriptive method of the decision making process that, although formal, encourages discussion of the material "correction" of the decision. CLS rejects entirely any discussion of decision "correction, " which makes the two theoretical perspectives antagonistic in that sense. Th e use I make of the concept of internal coherence bears no relation either to the idea of a "correct" decision or to an axiological minimal content (or any "substantive" correction) of the decision. My use of the concept relates to the conditions of language intelligibility at a much more basic level than is seen in an analysis of the above mentioned authors.
CLS's criticism of the concept of coherence is not addressed to the principles of the consequent utilization of language. Th at makes it possible to attune that concept, on a fundamental level, with a critical approach, while accepting the principle of indeterminacy.
Th e concept of coherence that is criticized by CLS derives from the development of the "science of law" (juridical science) in the German theories of the nineteenth century. According to that, there would be general principles in law that could be known through scientifi c methods (induction and deduction) and that would consequently be coded in such a way that law could be expressed by means of systematic and coherent codes. Th is notion of coherence relates to the ideal of a coherent normative system, the most fundamental norm being more general and the most specifi ed ones being more specifi c.
Th e theory aims at providing a method for the decisions to be "correct, " something radically denied by the CLS.
It is important to say that a "scientifi c" idea of law is foreign to the North American tradition, although this idea infl uenced the juridical teachings in the United States at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries.
27 For Americans, the "science of law" is something distant from their reality, because in the North American tradition, the primary protagonist 26 MACCORMICK, Neil. Legal reasoning and legal theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. in law is the judge, who is a problem solver, not a theorist. Th e tenets of the "science of law" --emphasis on the creation of a juridical cohesive "system, " formalism, and limits to the application of equity --are all factors that in theory limit the judge's activity as a problem solver, and therefore are not welcome in that tradition.
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For the purposes of this paper, therefore, I do not want to use the concept of coherence in the same way the interpretive authors do. I also do not want to combat the concept of coherence that CLS criticizes. From the CLS point of view, coherence is a myth that serves to support the idea that the judicial system is a logical self-referential system, in which there would be always a correct answer to whatever legal dispute.
CLS is critical of coherence in the fi rst sense that I use the concept. According to this idea, 29 contradictions in the predominant legal doctrine, the one that advocates the existence of logical coherence and of a normative "system, " result in the concept of "indeterminacy. " Hence, no correct answer or correct decision for a legal problem Andrew Altman holds that there are two tendencies within CLS, one radical and one moderate. According to the author, the radical tendency is associated with deconstructivism and advocates a lack of objective structure in law or any other social institution. Law would be a conjuncture of words void of meaning to which anyone could place signifi cance that seems more suitable to them. Th e moderate tendency rejects the affi rmation of the radical theory that there is no structure of objective reality in law or society. Th is tendency affi rms that words do have a nuclear meaning, but that the interpretations given to them are subject to moral and political beliefs. In the present paper, the distinction bears no greater signifi cance, as the principles that unite both tendencies are suffi cient to identify them as a sole theoretic movement. It appears to me, however, that the moderate school more adequately describes the judicial phenomena. ALTMAN, Andrew. Critical legal studies: a liberal critique. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 30 Th e expression "Rule of Law" has no precise meaning, implying a set of conditions such as independent and steady institutions, democratic government, civil and procedural rights, accountability etc. the law's capacity to coerce the application of power. Th e idea that power can be limited by law is a fetish, since law is not created to limit the power of those who themselves created it. Rule of Law serves to take power away from individuals, and therefore must be attacked. 32 Th e principle of indeterminacy is the one according to which law is not systematic and does not provide normative answers to all situations. Th ere is a certain degree of indeterminacy in legal norms that has necessarily to be fulfi lled by the judger's subjectivity.
33 Th e anti-formalism principle refutes the pretense of "rational neutrality" in the decision making process. Formalism is intended as a decision making method, according to which it is possible to decide by means of formal logical deduction.
34 Th e principle of contradiction means that le- "Th e second major impact of the welfare state on law is the turn from formalistic to purposive or policy-oriented styles of legal reasoning and from concerns with formal justice to an interest in procedural and substantive justice. Before further discussion, these terms should be defi ned. Legal reasoning is formalistic when the mere invocation of rules and the deduction of conclusions from them is believed suffi cient to form every authoritative legal choice. It is purposive when the decision about how to apply a rule depends on a judgment of how most eff ectively to achieve the purposes ascribed to the rule. Th e diff erence between these two types of legal reasoning is one between the criteria thought appropriate to the overt justifi cation or criticism of offi cial decisions; it does not pretend to describe the actual gal practices refl ect the ideological battle to gain prevalence of a certain perspective of human relations. Finally, the marginality principle proposes that law is not a key factor in determining social behavior.
Th e principle that should be analyzed specifi cally is that of indeterminacy, because from it derives the proposition that decisions are incontrollable. It is with this principle that coherence must be compatible for my intentions in this paper to make sense.
One of the central CLS arguments to the criticism of coherence in law is that judicial norms are expressed in natural language, therefore in polyssemic, imprecise, inherently undetermined language. When a norm has to be applied, the decision making process through which this is done is never a purely rational process, so it is ideologically conditioned. 35 If words are, to a certain extent, undetermined, so are laws. From that derives the idea that there is no logically correct decision, and, consequently, the conclusion that judicial decisions are a product of judges' personal choices. If there is no way to determine the "correctness" of a given decision, and if judicial decisions are always the expression of the judges' personal views, the decision will always be the result of a political option. "Coherence" is criticized by CLS based on the fact that it is a false and mystifying declaration that a judicial system can be coherent, and that this coherence is related to the possibility that a given decision is received as "correct" (= coherent). 36 Th e assertion that judicial decisions are the expression of political options has, to CLS, a denunciatory character. Th e idea of correctness works as a strategy of mystifi cation of the judicial discourse, and CLS emphasizes the fact that juridical decisions are a product of the causes and motives of decision. " UNGER, Roberto Mangabeira. Law in modern society: toward a criticism of social theory. New York: Th e Free Press, 1977. p. 194. 35 An interesting and contemporary example of the concept of indeterminacy is Mark Tushnet's commentary on the Bush v. Gore decision. TUSHNET, Mark. Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: an anticipatory intellectual history. Georgetown Law Journal, Washington, DC, v. 90, n. 1, p. 113-125, Nov. 2001. p. 113. 36 TUSHNET, Mark. Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: an anticipatory intellectual history. Georgetown Law Journal, Washington, DC, v. 90, n. 1, p. 113-125, Nov. 2001 . p. 100. Although it can be a perspective that may be criticized as reducing the CLS pretensions, it was disseminated in such a manner that today, this theoretical principle identifi es them.
judges' will and, therefore, the idea that there is a neutral outcome of the decision making process is false. CLS uses the concept of coherence as a rhetorical instrument to show discrepancies in the predominant judicial theory. One of the constant statements of the so-called "crits" 39 is that law and the "political sciences" do not possess an ensemble of techniques and institutions that can resolve the problem of social domination. Th ey also maintain that the predominant legal theory, which grounds itself on the concepts of technical rationality, effi ciency and inexorability of the political and economical order as it is, is a device of the exercise of power.
Legal culture is imposed by means of an institutional structure that allows the use of force, and it is a prerogative for those who know how to operate such discourse. Th is makes it excluding and instrumental. terpreter and the norm, which could approximate it from a hermeneutic perspective. However, the complexity of the relationship between interpreter and text is not seen as a matter to be investigated with the perspective of the outcome of such an interaction, nor is it seen as a starting point for the investigation into the decision making method.
41 Th e idea of indeterminacy works, therefore, as a denunciatory vehicle for the inherent politicization of the deciding act, since the judger inexorably applies his ideology in the process of arriving at a decision. Th at practice is part of the "deviationist doctrine".
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Indeterminacy can also be explained by the statement that predication, the act of judging, is always a strategic act, regardless of whether it searches for a normative sense within a framework of possible meanings 43 or in a penumbral area.
44 Th e matter of predictability of the decisions is not fundamental to the CLS critical project, but the idea that law is an arena for political struggles in which diff erent ideologies compete is. Th e task of defi ning the normative sense of any given norm is a political task and must be explained as such.
It is ethically unacceptable to deny the political dimension of legal practices. Not only norms, but law itself is undetermined because both the normative meanings and the ideology of those who determine them are undetermined as well.
45
Even if CLS has fi rmly attacked legal formalism, the critique of the notion of coherence does not depend on the type of reason applicable to a decision, and it is aimed at the argument posed in a deductive form. Th e possibility of a "correct answer" is denied because decisions are expressions of a political project and do not come about as acts of "pure deduction". CLS critique is also aimed at the "correct policy" 41 Th ere is no similarity between the CLS proposal and a hermeneutic proposal, such as Gadamer' argument, according to which the correct decision is the one that maximizes certain consequences that will probably appear as a consequence of the decision. If those consequences accomplish a certain purpose in public policy, then the "right answer" has been found. In the policy argument, deduction beginning with a given norm does not resolve satisfactorily the matter pending on decision, so considerations of non-deductive reasons, standards and collective objectives must enter the decision making process.
Dworkin, for example, proposes a decision method that is highly criticized by CLS because it suggests the notion of a "correct answer. "
46 Th e fi gure of a Herculean judge is condemned by CLS because it is taken as an inadequate tool to explain the decision making process since, in reality, deciding the best outcome is not an exclusive product of rational ponderings, but instead, expression of political idiosyncratic preferences. 47 Consequently, both in a deductive argument and a policy argument, a false presumption of implicit ontology would exist. It is precisely against the idea of an essential "correctness" of decisions that CLS manifests itself. It is not the affi rmation that judicial reasoning follows a deductive form that is contested, but the idea that there is a systematic coherence in law that can be evaluated with the result of the decision making process.
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Th e concept of coherence used by CLS is related to the idea that a supposed judicial system would provide "correct" decisions if the "correct" aspects involved in a certain matter pending decision were taken into consideration. Coherence is, in this sense, a concept relative to a normative system that has a logical sense that must be observed, if the correct method is applied. Dworkin's project is inspired by the same humanistic orientation as the CLS project, and it seems wrong to think that a simplistic opposition between their goals exists. Th e most widely disseminated idea of opposition between the projects is that Dworkin believes it is always possible to obtain a defi nite answer, while proponents of CLS think that no exact answer is ever likely. Despite being inserted in the fi eld that CLS calls liberal legal theory, Dworkin concerns himself with the individual rights of the subjects in law. Th e CLS criticism seems correct, but it does not imply an absolute denial of rationality in legal practice.
CLS adopts a methodic doubt about the empirical possibility of "correctness" of judicial decisions or any sort of universalization of values, but it does not propose radical skepticism. Although the critical posture means a constant attempt of demystifi cation of the discourse and judicial practice, the idea that decisions must be passed by the judiciary seems to be institutionally the less imperfect alternative.
49
If the application of legal norms is a political act, is it possible to demand of the judiciary some sort of coherence for the sake of rationality and predictability of the normative sense of decisions? Is accepting indeterminacy the same as accepting the impossibility of any kind of control over judicial decisions? If the answers to these questions are that there is no possibility of any controlling or rational appraisal of decisions, and that it is not possible to expect rationality from the judiciary, then the CLS project will have exhausted itself with its own limit of denouncing the status quo.
50 I do not think this is the case.
"I think of my own initial faith in legal reasoning as like the religion of eighteenth-century intellectuals who believed that there were good rational reasons to think there was a God, that the existence of a God justifi ed all kinds of hopeful views about the world, and that popular belief in God had greatly benefi cial social consequences. But they also had confi rmatory religious experiences that were phenomenologically distinct from the experience of rational demonstration. "KENNEDY, Duncan. Th e critique of rights in critical legal studies. in left legalism/left critique. Durham: Duke University Press, 2002. p. 192 . In an earlier work, however, Kennedy seems to think in a diff erent way. It possibly can be explained by the fact that the previous article was a manifesto rather than a theoretical paper. In his words: "Th e outcomes of struggle are not preordained by any aspect of the social totality, and the outcomes within law have no 'inherent logic' that would allow one to predict outcomes 'scientifi cally' , or to reject in advance specifi c attempts by judges and lawyers to work limited transformations of the system. " KENNEDY, Duncan. Legal education and the reproduction of hierarchy: a polemic against the system, a critical America. New York: New York Press, 2004. p. 41. what is being said because they generally share the same knowledge of the words being used in a certain message (semantics) and also share the knowledge of how words are being used in that specifi c speech (grammar).
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Internal coherence is, therefore, that which is expected of an emitter who professes messages and who wants to be understood in a satisfactory way. Th us, the more precise the use of words and grammatical organization of the message, and the more pleasant the style, the greater the chances of success in communication. For example, if one names an object a book, one cannot simultaneously name it a glass without the perception of incoherence in the message. Obviously, sometimes the concept will be debatable or the insertion of the item in one class of objects or another will be a highly questionable procedure and will depend, to a great extent, on the general system construed by a certain community of communicating individuals.
In a quite synthesized way, a person who calls a 51 Evidently there will always be borderline situations in which using a certain name to speak of something will not be so simple. Someone might have diffi culty in calling a clock and a watch by the same name. In reality, in some languages there are diff erent words to express similar objects. In any case, what matters is that language implies coherence as an essential requisite to its successful utilization.
certain object x cannot state that the object is a non-x or any other object. Simultaneous contradictory pronouncements are incoherent and erode the sense of communication according to the logical principle of non-contradiction. Th e same occurs when someone suggests that a certain object, in a given situation, must be subject to a certain attribute and, at the same time, suggests that the same object cannot be subject to the same attribute. Th is only makes sense in a situation in which one (or some) condition taken into consideration changes, but it must be announced for the sake of message intelligibility. Th e internal coherence of language use is, therefore, a condition for intelligibility of the informative discourse.
Compatibility of the internal perspective of coherence with the critical theory
What is the benefi t of the use of the concept of internal coherence in the scope of a critical theory like CLS?
What is the signifi cance of the conceptual diff erences of external and internal coherence for such a theory?
Th e concept of coherence, from the internal perspective of language, is perfectly compatible with the critical theory. As a formal concept, internal coherence serves as a logical criterion for evaluating the isonomous use of concepts in the judicial discourse, and it is not vul- at that conclusion, and those criteria must be descriptive, or the valuation would be subject to criticism because it is based on not entirely revealed elements.
Th e emitter would have to say that the player is good because, for example, a) he is faster than the others; b) plays more games than the others because he suff ers fewer injuries; c) scores more than the others; d) makes better passes than the others, etc.
52 Publicity of the descriptive criteria for the judgment about the one who is under analysis is necessary to allow for verifi cation if 52 Th e criteria used for such a valuation would be arbitrary to a certain extent, and one way to question them is an ideological discussion on what concept of "good player" can be seen as correct. Coherence guarantees us the internal possibility of verifying rationality in the use of language by an emitter when he holds forth about objects in similar conditions.
another player, submitted to the same judgment, is to be judged impartially or, in other words, isonomically. Otherwise, nothing would prevent a football commenter who is unsympathetic to a certain player from stating that he is not a good player, even if he obtains results similar to the player who was initially evaluated as a "good player. " Th e fact that ruling is a political act, and that the decision making process is subject to political and idiosyncratic infl uences, can lead a person who deals with law to become skeptical, in the sense that if ruling is merely an act of will without any kind of rational control, there is nothing to do but play "roulette" with judicial decisions, and ultimately to distance oneself from this fi eld of results that refl ect the personal choices of the deciders. On the other hand, a theoretical tool for optimizing the law (at least from a formal standpoint) can be used in a combative way, as it is theoretically powerful and politically active.
What I state is, hence, the possibility of joining an analytical approach to the critical nature of CLS, with the purpose of responding to the criticism that CLS off ers no practical applicability resulting from its theoretical goal of denouncing the power relations that underlie judicial decisions.
Evaluative words and their political dimension
Th e theory of language with which I think it is possible to advance the CLS critical project is Universal Metaethics investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are they merely social inven-Moral language is prescriptive, as is juridical language. Th e imperative form, typical of prescriptive language, is expressed through commands, a characteristic which approximates the relationship between moral language and legal language. Th e utility of Hare's theory for the purposes of this paper is that it helps identify the problem of decision reasoning complexity, especially when applied to expressions with large semantic imprecision in its evaluative sense.
Th e central point in universal prescriptivism is that words' meanings are linked to how they are used in prescriptive discourses. Meaning is not only the link between a description and an object (the relation between something and what it means), but it is also determined by the rules that regulate the use of words.
In natural language, words 55 possess an "open consistency, " and the application of legal norms reveals the complexity that derives from this characteristic. Th e logical linguistic rules provide words stability in their practical use, allowing for intelligibility among speakers.
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Indeterminacy is an inherent feature of the problem of norms application, a natural derivation from linguistic polysemy. Hare, however, identifi es a specifi c type of word that has a particular function in prescriptive discourse, since it implies a positive or negative quality of the object: the so-called "evaluative word. " 57 tions? Do they involve more than expressions of our individual emotions? Metaethical answers to these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves. FIESER, James. Ethics. Th e University of Tennessee at Martin, Martin. Available at: <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/ethics.htm>.
55
I make here the distinction between natural language and symbolic language. Evaluative words and expressions are identifi ed by Karl Engish with the name "undetermined normative judicial concepts in the appropriate sense. " Th e expression "normative concept" has two possible meanings: a) an improper sense: normative concept in the sense that it refers to an object perceptible by the senses, but that is given a judicial institutional "costume. " As examples we would have: "marriage, " "public worker, " and "minor. " Another sense in the use of the concept would be b) a proper sense: a normative concept that is always in need of valuation to be applied in the case at hand. Th e author states: "If someone is married or a minor, this can be 'established' through descriptive criteria. In contrast, if a characterizing predisposition is 'undignifi ed, ' if a motive is 'vile, ' if a document is 'pornographic, ' if Judging is an extremely complex procedure for various reasons, including those presented by CLS in relation to indeterminacy. Th e complexity of judgment elaboration procedure is increased when the applicable norms are expressed through words that have evaluative functions. Words and expressions like "excessive" and "good-faith, " for example, do not have stable descriptive meanings because they do not refer to any physical-molecular phenomena. Th e meaning of those words change as they refer to diff erent situations.
Decisions in which evaluative words are used are more prone to bring to light judges' political stances, because the judger must opt for certain meanings related to concepts such as "justice, " "market, " "merit, " etc. An example of this is the contractual idea of "good-faith. " To perform a contract in "good-faith" is something diffi cult to identify precisely. If the judge does not make his evaluative options adequately explicit while applying norms with evaluative words, a defi cit of reasoning would exist in the decision. In other words, to say, for example, what is a "consumer's contractual clause in accordance with good faith, " is to implicitly assume a concept of market, consumer and behavioral expectancy of contractual parties. A more liberal judge (in the economic sense of the term) will rule diff erently than another with a more protective view of the consumer, and this distinction will become clearer with greater access to the reasons that determined the verdict.
Th e analysis of decision coherence implies the idea of universality of judgments. One who says something in a given situation must, for coherence's sake, take the same stand, given a similar situation. Th e notion of universality of judgments is central to the understanding a representation is 'blasphemous, ' -one must consider for this purpose the famous George Grosz painting, representing Christ on the cross with a gas mask and soldier boots on his feet (about the above, RGerST. 64, P.121 et seq.), this can only be decided based on a valuation. Th e normative concepts of the like are called concepts 'in lack of valuation substantiality. ' With this horrible expression one intends that the normative volume of these concepts must be substantiated case by case, through acts of valuation. " ENGISH, Karl. Introdução ao pensamento jurídico. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2001. p. 213 . Th e undetermined normative judicial concepts are the ones that are so in their own sense, according to the author. Th ese are the ones that properly distinguish themselves from the descriptive concepts and that bring specifi c problems to the act of interpretation/application of normative texts. of universal prescriptivism. In order to grant the possibility of criticism, the opinions we have of things have to be of a descriptive nature.
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While affi rming something, the speaker is responsible for the future use of that word.
59 Because evaluative words 60 are those whose meanings depend on the qualifi cation of a certain object and not the description of the object, meaning is granted, therefore, because of the logical-semantic function in the discourse.
Th e complexity of evaluative words' use is revealed in the understanding that, while qualifying other objects, their sense always refers to a given situation. Th is characteristic implies that the use of evaluative words is more diffi cult than the use of descriptive ones, whose sense remains static between the object and what it means; in the latter, the denomination of the object is purely conventional. 61 Given that the application of the concept of uni- I use the expressions: "evaluative words, " "evaluative expressions" and "evaluative terms" interchangeably, indicating the same idea of distinction between "evaluative" and "descriptive. "
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In onomatopoeia cases, an interesting matter arises that may not be mere convention, but instead may hold some relation to a physical characteristic of the described object and, so, may have something to do with the description of an essence. "It is nearly impossible to fi nd another aspect of semantics that has caused such interest as onomatopoeia. Th e vast literatures about this vary from capricious fantasies about color and sounds of speech to experiences conducted in laboratorial conditions. " ULLMANN, Stephen. Semântica: uma introdução à ciência do signifi cado. 2. ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1970. p. 178 . According to the author, onomatopoeias have the following points of semantic interest: 1) there is an intrinsic similarity between the name and the sense, in such a way that onomatopoeias are alike in diff erent languages; 2) the phonetic motivation exists between name and sense. Sounds adjust to the meaning of the object; 3) even when the sound is adequate to the expression of meaning, onomatopoeia will come into play if the context is favorable; 4) a word is onomatopoeic if felt as such. On the search for phonetic motivation between the word and the object's sense the author says: "Th is motivation search extended itself till the written word. Some authors say they feel an analogy between the meaning of certain words and their visual form. Th e poet Lecomte de Lisle once said that if the French word for the idea of 'paon' were to be written without the o, one would no longer see the bird opening its tail feathers. Going even further, Paul Claudel envisions on both tt in the French word 'toit' (roof) the gable-ends of a house and the caldron and wheels in the word 'locomotive. ' Th ese extravagances seem to remount to a primitive way of writing in which versalization of judgments relates to the logical principle of non-contradiction, and because the meaning of evaluative words is situational, the diffi culty in appreciating coherence when evaluative words are used is greater than when descriptive words are used. Th e problem is brought on by the use of formal logical principles applied to language. 62 Evaluative words have the purpose of qualifying an object by positively or negatively appreciating it. Th ey are words like, for example, "good, " "excessive, " "pretty, "
"adequate" and expressions such as "good faith, " "excessively onerous, " "reasonable value, " etc.
Prescriptivism is a principle that regulates the subject's actions. In other words, it expresses the individual commitment character of a certain verdict. Th e logical character of prescriptivism lays in the fact that he who professes a sincere judgment must be committed to the adoption of the action's consequences, being the agent in any position, even in one that may cause negative consequences.
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Evaluative words do not distinguish themselves from descriptive words by the fact that they are imprecise.
In fact, one similarity between them is that words like, for example, "red" that have a descriptive sense, as well as the evaluative word "good, " used to describe a "good car, " are equally imprecise in their use. Code is formulated by means of an evaluative expression that shows the diffi culties and points out the risks. In a contract of suppliance of a product or service there is a contractual clause excessively onerous to the consumer, due to supervening facts Th en:
Th ere will be a judicial revision of its content to restore the previously existing balance.
It is important to recognize that in this imperative there is a problematic expression from the hermeneutic point of view, precisely because it does not possess the nature of a descriptive expression: "excessively onerous contractual clause. " Th e problem lies in the fact that there is no way to proceed to a semantic stabilization prior to the application of such norm in relation to the terms that function as evaluative words, as in the case of "excessive onerousness. "
In the process of norm application, the judge will have to demonstrate, in descriptive terms, the criteria used to formulate the judgment that the consumer's situation is considered excessively onerous. He will, then, reveal his personal preferences, his values, his way of seeing the world in a more transparent way when eff ectively demonstrating such criteria. Th e more justifi ed the decision, the clearer the judge's political option will be and the more visible the possible incoherencies in a set of diff erent decisions.
Th e idea of coherence relates to, as seen, the concept of isonomy, the principle of justice according to which agents with similar characteristics and in similar situations deserve the same treatment. Th is is also a principle of moral language that allows for a logical appreciation of the rulings. Although there is not just one possible and certain content to a moral or judicial judgment, logic does not allow inconsistent patterns to be adopted or that diff erent judgments for similar situations are made. It is important to note that the conduct determined by the norm to the supplier is not totally revealed. His duty is, having occurred the change of conditions with the consequent excessive onerousness, alter the clause's content so that contractual balance may be restored.
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Th e Bush v. Gore case decided by the United States Supreme Court places the question of exceptionality of ap-Th e meaning of evaluative words is prescriptive, and in agreement with this meaning, it is not acceptable from an ethical and logical point of view, that the same agent can profess diff erent judgments in identical situations without losing the idea of isonomy and, therefore, moral or judicial coherence. A logical judgment must always be universal; in other words, the same kind of decision must be professed for the same kind of problem if all things remain the same. 70 plication of a certain norm. In this case, exceptionality is transformed into rule, if verifi ed, in posterior cases; in the name of coherence, the Court will have to apply the same solution. A segment of the decision that suggests the exception to the principle of universality is: "Th e recount process, in its features here described, is inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial offi cer. Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities. " http://www.law. cornell.edu/supct/html/00-949.ZPC.html , em 02;11;2006. 70 Th e use of rhetorical resources that mask the intents and political reasons of a given decision may be present in the judicial sphere and the political one. Political theory draws attention to the matter of accountability of those who retain power but do not act according to the arguments they present. Although politics is diff erent from law in many ways, the concept of coherence can be applied to both fi elds of social practices, because both deal with matters of public interest and involve delegation of power from society. Discretion in politics is a lot more visible than in law because of the very characteristic of practice of political power. In politics, the struggle for access to power marks the public disputes in which speeches are made without preoccupation with coherence, but with an eye toward what gains more sympathy from those who receive the message. It is a mundane fact that a politician affi rms something during his campaign which is then ignored aft er entering offi ce. In any case, it is possible to verify to some extent the respect that a certain government has toward its electors if the campaign promises become government actions. Since language is a source of imprecision, it is necessary that the arguments in which decisions are based are submitted to exhaustive criticism as a way to reveal the values, preconceptions and intentions of those responsible for such decisions. International treaties, laws, judicial decisions and political discourses are all expressed in natural language, which is a source of potential multiple meanings of messages. For example, in an article about sustainable development and terrorism, Atapattu shows the discursive incoherence of the decision makers in a global setting, illustrating how rhetorical discourse of the "international terrorism risk" serves the purpose of justifying enormous expenses on safety, even while a great portion of the world suff ers from malnutrition and lack of basic sanitation, the cause of many deaths, despite the minimal comparative expense of environmental protection. Ironically, many international treaties, including the Geneva Convention, talk of What is "excessively onerous" aft er all? Judges certainly saturate decisions with their political points of view, values, preferences, world visions and consequential considerations. But if these aspects do not clearly appear in the decision, the audience (society) cannot criticize it.
If the judges do not make explicit the reasons that lead them to make a decision one way or another, the possibility of decision criticism is seriously undermined.
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Taking for granted the idea of indeterminacy of norms, what we can do is to demand from the judiciary that the valuation options present at the moment of deciding be explained in the fullest way possible and that the decision adheres to some kind of linguistic coherence.
Conclusions
Evaluative words and expressions are common in judgments that should be made under concrete situations; these expressions do not have a priori descriptive meanings. Th ey are words and expressions whose meaning needs to be identifi ed during the decision making process.
Th e requisite of decision motivation should ideally allow the receiver of a decision to know not only the deductive process made by the judger, but also the value options made, which should appear in the ratio decidendi.
If the descriptive elements that identify the reasons why judges rule a certain way are not clear, it will not be possible to properly analyze the merit of the decision. Th is procedure has, in my opinion, two diff erent but the concern with the environment's integrity. ATAPATTU, Sumudu. Sustainable development and terrorism: international linkages and a case study of Sri Lanka. Environmental Law and Policy Review, Missouri, v. 30, n. 2, p. 273-320, Winter, 2006. 71 Th e duty to show motivations behind decisions is treated by the procedural doctrine as the "principle of motivation of judicial decisions" and aims at granting public control over the exercise of juridical exercise. CINTRA, Antonio Carlos de Araújo; GRINOVER, Ada Pellegrini; DINA-MARCO, Candido Rangel. Teoria geral do processo. 19. ed. São Paulo: Malheiros, 2003. p. 68 . Th e principle of motivation of judicial decisions performs a political function, as one can evaluate the impartiality of the judge and the legality and justice of the decisions. Article 93, IX of the Brazilian Federal Constitution mentions the principle of publicity that guarantees the possibility of checking the acts of those involved in judicial procedures. It is in the presence of people that the decisions must be made, a principle that is also stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 10. Id., 2003, p. 69. Universitas JUS, v. 26, n. 1, p. 29-44, 2015 Critical legal studies and coherence in the decision-making process: the Brazilian case related consequences. (1) Judges remain apparently free to decide similar cases in diff erent ways without having to compromise with the idea of coherence; (2) Judges only expose partially and indirectly their ideological preferences.
Th e fi rst consequence derives from the fact that if someone does not determine the meaning of a certain evaluative expression, indicating its descriptive sense, the true meaning of the expression will never be known for sure. Th is way, if someone only says that an individual acts in good faith without stating what that means, then the following moment it could mean the opposite, without it ever being considered contradictory to the criteria previously adopted.
Th e second consequence is that by not defi ning a word or evaluative expression adequately, the decider will not express his ideological convictions. Th e myth of neutrality is reinforced, and so is the possibility that decisions can be produced according to an exclusively formal deductive method. Th e important legacy of CLS is the idea of indeterminacy, the fi ght against formalism and the attempt to demystify legal discourse, revealing its inherently political content.
Th is legacy, despite being critically powerful, fi nds its limit in the radical assumption of the indeterminacy of norms and the impossibility of any optimizing theoretical approach. Although the decision making process is uncontrollable empirically, this does not mean that decisions are totally irrational. Th e idea that laws are expressed in natural language implies its application as a discourse that must have a minimum of rationality.
Recognizing the anguishing insecurity resulting from the idea of indeterminacy may have the perverse effect of encouraging a nihilistic or radically skeptical posture, which seems to me quite contrary to the transformational propositions of CLS. Th e way out of this logical trap is adopting a skeptical moral posture combined with criticism grounded in formal logic (no "minimum moral" content assumed), along with adopting a theoretical tool that allows for some sort of advancement from the critical potential of CLS. Universal Prescriptivism can be that instrument because it allows the criticism of norm application discourses.
